|
History of Potassium Iodide Early Findings Three Mile Island Chernobyl Current Status NRC Response NRC Information Notice Early Findings Development. The value of KI as a radiation protective was first recognized in 1954 following a Pacific nuclear bomb test. Shifting winds blew radioactive fallout in an unexpected direction, contaminating two small atolls 150 miles away. Although residents were quickly evacuated, it was too late. Within 20 years, most of the island's adult population, and all of its children, had developed some form of thyroid disease or cancer. Doctors studying the problem soon realized that radioactive iodine in the fallout had entered the island's food and water supplies. It had been inhaled and ingested by the islanders and absorbed by their thyroid glands. Over the years it led to the steady, inevitable, development of cancer and other thyroid malfunctions. While the fallout had contained traces of other radioactive products, these had played little or no role. This understanding led experts to speculate that much of the danger from radiation might be eliminated if the absorption of radioiodine by the thyroid gland could be blocked. As a result, a search began for a class of drugs that later became known as "thyroid blocking agents." By 1957, scientists had concluded that potassium iodide represented an ideal thyroid blocking agent. This material had been used for years in other therapies, was known to be extremely safe, inexpensive, had a long shelf life, and could prevent 99% of the radioactive iodine in fallout from being absorbed. Initial Recommendations. Though KI was quickly recognized for its radio-protective value for civil defense programs, it was not until 1977 that there was real interest in the drug. That year, the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP), acting on recommendations of the American Physical Society's Reactor Safety Committee, suggested that a far more compelling reason to produce KI was the development of nuclear power in the United States. As the NCRP noted:
Four months later, at Three Mile Island in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the US suffered its worst commercial nuclear power-plant accident. RETURN TO TOP Three Mile Island The 1979 meltdown at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant brought the US closer to a nuclear catastrophe than ever before or since. Fearing iodine might escape, the emergency response authorities sent to TMI immediately ordered KI for possible distribution. But none was available, so in an unprecedented action, the FDA attempted to manufacture the drug. Tablets could not be produced in time, so raw potassium iodide was mixed with water to make a low-grade pharmaceutical. Difficulties were encountered in finding bottles and matching caps, and there was no time to prepare labeling or usage instructions. Worse, the solution began breaking-down in the bottles almost immediately, and officials later acknowledged that they had serious concerns about its safety due to its poor quality. However, faced with the possibility of millions of people being exposed to radioactive iodine without any protection whatsoever, authorities reasoned that poor KI was better than none, and decided to ship what they could. It took six days, and eventually 237,013 bottles were sent to the reactor site. The accident was nearly over by the time the product arrived. It was stored (in secret, watched by an armed guard) in a Harrisburg warehouse while officials tried to figure out if--and how--to distribute it. Because the amount received was far less than what might be needed, emergency personnel expressed serious fears of the possibility of rioting should a distribution be attempted. Fortunately, though, the accident was contained, and no iodine was released. With relief, the FDA ordered the KI solution destroyed, and the incident faded from memory. But it could have been different. Harrisburg lies west of New York and Washington, and had a major release occurred with easterly winds, large cities on the Atlantic coast could have received significant exposure. Later, estimates pointed to the possibility of more than 500,000 people suffering thyroid injury in the "worst-case" scenario. The enormous danger posed by the unavailability of KI was apparent to the Presidential panel (the Kemeny Commission) that investigated the TMI accident. Their report to the nation noted:
But the nuclear industry resisted the recommendations to stockpile KI. Fearing the drug's availability would send a message that nuclear power was unsafe, industry groups argued that another serious accident was virtually impossible. Further, they claimed that even if one should occur, there could be no release of radioactive iodine. Surprisingly, they were supported in this position by the NRC, which was also worried about its reputation. Like the industry they regulated, the NRC was against any lessening of public confidence in nuclear technology, and despite their initial promises to support KI stockpiling, they chose to "study" the matter and wait for the memory of TMI to disappear. They studied KI for six years. Then, the agency broke its earlier promise to stockpile, reneged on its commitment, and formulated a policy that called mandatory KI stockpiling "not worthwhile." Instead, a policy emerged that was premised on the idea that it would be cheaper to let people develop cancer and treat them afterwards, than to use KI to prevent the disease in the first place. Essentially, the industry decided to protect itself instead of the people. The appalling disregard for the health of Americans inherent in this policy has not abated over time. It was succinctly summed-up by the Director of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, who wrote that his agency "stands firmly behind its contention that hundreds of thousands of people live normal healthy lives without functioning thyroid glands." Virtually no one challenged this policy or the reasoning behind it -- until Chernobyl. RETURN TO TOP Chernobyl On April 26, 1986, the nuclear reactor at the Russian Chernobyl Nuclear Station exploded. It was the world's worst nuclear power accident, and it scattered radioactive iodine over thousands of square miles throughout Europe. Fortunately, much of the affected area was sparsely populated, and even more fortunate was the fact that the Soviets had large stockpiles of KI available (from old civil defense supplies) which they distributed within hours to people living close to the reactor. As a result, people in the Pripyat region near Chernobyl were protected and there has been no increase in thyroid cancer in this area. Farther away from the reactor, though, distribution was much less thorough. As a result, by the year 2000, over 11,000 known (and possibly many unknown) cases of a rare form of childhood thyroid cancer appeared, and the actual total number of case expected by the year 2010 is unknown. Yet in Poland, where 18 million people were given KI following the accident, no increase in thyroid cancer related to Chernobyl has been seen. Chernobyl proved that massive accidents were possible, and that optimistic assumptions by the NRC and the nuclear industry that radioactive iodine could not escape were clearly wrong. Follow-up studies have also demonstrated that the decision by the Russian, Polish and other governments to administer stored KI had been correct, and that stockpiled KI, issued immediately after an accident was as valuable as the experts had predicted. This was unequivocally stated by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in a study following Chernobyl, where they reported that,
These actions undoubtedly saved hundreds of thousands from cancer and other thyroid problems. While the Soviets deserve criticism for many of their actions regarding the Chernobyl incident, their emergency response plans, and their provisions and preparation for the health and safety of their citizens, were noteworthy. By comparison, the US government's actions at Three Mile Island, though well motivated, lacked supplies and planning; were confused; contradictory; and needlessly dangerous to millions of people. But despite the Chernobyl experience, US policy makers continued to fight KI stockpiling, with the NRC making the baffling statement that,
Current Status Over the years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has consistently made promises that would assure KI availability for all Americans. After Three Mile Island, for example, the NRC pledged to support a national stockpiling plan, and following the demonstrated evidence of KI's value at Chernobyl, the NRC agreed to require states to consider it in emergency response planning. Finally, in 1998, in a highly encouraging development, the NRC announced it would fund the purchase of KI for any state wishing to stockpile the drug. But the Agency's actions suggest these promises will never be kept. While not disputing the value and health benefits of the product, individuals from the various Federal and State agencies that crafted the existing KI policy remain resolute in opposing stockpiling, fearing that this would have a negative effect on the public's perception of nuclear power. "The continuing debate over ... KI has served no useful purpose other than to unduly undermine the effectiveness of nearly two decades of sound radiological emergency planning and preparedness", claims the Director of Nuclear Safety in one large state. Another senior official, arguing that stockpiling is unnecessary because states are already permitted to offer KI, claims that changes to existing policy are not required, since "the current 'Federal Policy on [KI] Distribution...' provides sufficient guidance to state and local governments [on how and when to distribute KI]" ¾ while neglecting to mention that this policy is obviously worthless if there is no KI to distribute. The reality is that significant stockpiles of the product do not exist today, and are unlikely to exist in the near future. Despite claims of support by individual staff members and its Commissioners, the NRC seems curiously unable to overcome the objections to stockpiling by the nuclear industry -- which would have us believe emergencies are impossible. Instead, officially rejected statistics have been used to support seriously flawed conclusions, and promises to assure KI protection for all Americans have repeatedly been broken. In 1998, in an attempt to justify its general position on KI, the NRC issued a document in draft form entitled "Assessment of the Use of Potassium Iodide as a Public Protective Action During Severe Reactor Accidents", (NUREG-1633). It was an extremely important document -- not for its conclusions (which virtually all experts rejected), but for its demonstration of the lengths the NRC was willing to go to discredit KI, even if this meant distorting the issue beyond recognition. For example...
And, (as reported in the New York Times, of April 20, 1999), following the latest meeting of the Task Force, the NRC announced that it is withdrawing its 1998 promise to fund the purchase of KI. Therefore, in the event of an accident, Americans can expect that government provided KI will be unavailable, and most people will face radiation unprotected. Or, one can purchase iOSAT™ from Anbex. RETURN TO TOP NRC Response Nuclear Regulatory Commission Estimates To appreciate the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's policy on KI, it is important to understand the estimates made in their document, Examination of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) as an Emergency Protective Measure for Nuclear Reactor Accidents. (NUREG/CR-1433, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1980). This report describes the health effects of a nuclear accident in detail, and provides casualty estimates at various distances from a reactor. Although the report is highly technical and difficult to read, buried in its pages of statistics is the acknowledgment that a "Core-Melt Atmospheric" accident (that is, an accident like Chernobyl which releases a large portion of the reactor core into the atmosphere) could threaten millions of people. NUREG-1433 points out that thyroid growths (nodules) and other thyroid damage would be expected to occur for hundreds of miles downwind after an accident through breathing. This is described in tables 3 and 4 of the report, as shown below: Effects of Core-melt Atmospheric Accidents by Distance
QUANTITATIVE NOTES TO TABLE: For children, increase dose and probability of damage by an approximate factor of two. Weather conditions based on calculated probability distributions. Thyroid damage includes thyroid nodules (both benign and cancerous) and ablated thyroid. Assumed risk coefficient of 334 thyroid nodules per million person-rem to the thyroid. Includes inhalation dose only. Does not include ingestion. Probabilities conditional on accident occurring.
For children, increase dose and probability of damage by an approximate factor of two. Weather conditions based on calculated probability distributions. Thyroid damage includes thyroid nodules (both benign and cancerous) and ablated thyroid. Assumed risk coefficient of 334 thyroid nodules per million person-rem to the thyroid. Includes inhalation dose only. Does not include ingestion. Probabilities conditional on accident occurring. But the NRC limits its accident planning to 10 miles. In other words, there is nothing to protect people who, for example, are 50 miles away, despite the probability that 13% of all exposed adults (and about a quarter of the children) at this distance could be injured. Yet use of KI would prevent this -- a fact the NRC does not dispute. (See NRC notice regarding "radiation emergency potassium iodide" below.) RETURN TO TOP NRC Information Notice
RETURN TO TOP |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
